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In the shadow of Russia’s expansion in Africa, notably through the notorious company Wagner, or that of China, which has long been active in the region as well as in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been maneuvering on the African continent for several years and, more particularly, since the election of the late Ebrahim Raissi in August 2021.
Driven by the Iranian Presidency’s new approach to Africa and geopolitical upheaval on the continent - most notably the growing rejection by African states of the presence and influence of France and the United States - Iran has stepped up its diplomatic, economic and religious activity in the region. Through a vast network of structures and institutes - and even local politico-religious movements - serving as Tehran’s relays, the Iranian authorities are gradually carving out a new area of influence across the African continent, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and, even more so, in West Africa and the countries of the Great Rift Valley.
This Iranian investment in Africa serves the Islamic Republic in many ways: as well as creating a number of fruitful and sometimes highly strategic economic partnerships - such as the supply of uranium in the case of Niger, for example [1] - Iran is developing those parts of African society and elites that are favorable, or at least sympathetic, to its interests. The religious lever plays a fundamental role here; thanks to the numerous theological institutes and various other actors established across Africa, Iran has contributed in recent years to an increase, in terms of both size and influence, in the Shiite populations across the continent, once again offering itself large contingents of support.
This article sets out to explain Iran’s growing presence in Africa by looking first at the diplomatic activity of the Iranian authorities towards sub-Saharan countries (first part of this article) in recent years, before presenting the soft-power vectors deployed by Tehran across the African continent in order to increase its influence, both political and religious (second part of this article).
The last two years have been marked by unusual diplomatic activity in Africa: while Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian (who also died in the same helicopter crash as Ebrahim Raissi) visited Mali and Tanzania in August 2022 [2] and South Africa in August 2023 [3], his political affairs adviser Ali Bagheri Kani visited Niger [4] and Burkina-Faso [5] in January 2023 and, most importantly, Iranian President Ebrahim Raissi met the Kenyan authorities on 11 July 2023 - the first time this had happened in eleven years [6] - his counterpart in Uganda the following day -also the first time in eleven years [7] - the head of state of Zimbabwe again on 13 July -the last meeting of this kind was 14 years ago, in 2010 [8] - and, finally, he visited Algeria on 2 March 2024 [9] - again for the first time in 14 years.
Each of these visits was accompanied by the signing of numerous agreements - twelve memorandums of understanding in the fields of industry, energy, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and research were signed between Tehran and Harare for example [10] - and declarations of support for the local authorities, often in opposition to Europe, the United States and their allies. In Uganda, President Ebrahim Raissi, for example, welcomed the recent adoption of Ugandan legislation cracking down on LGTB circles, and criticized ‘the West which is trying to promote homosexuality and, in so doing, is trying to put an end to generations of human beings’ [11].
However, Tehran’s diplomatic activity in Africa is measured not only by Iranian visits to African countries, but also by visits to Iran by African leaders: for example, the Prime Minister of Niger visited Tehran in January 2024 [12], a few months after the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, in September 2023 [13]. The Iranian authorities are in fact exploiting the difficulties encountered by France and its allies in the Sahel to draw closer to the countries of the region, which have the double advantage of having a Muslim-majority population and, because of their diplomatic isolation following the coups d’état [14] that have taken place in recent years, are looking for new partners, particularly those in conflict with the ‘West’, such as Russia and Iran.
In this respect, the case of Niger is eloquent: the rapprochement between Niamey and Teheran led to discussions exploring the possibility of Niger delivering over 300 tons of Nigerien “yellow cake” (a uranium concentrate) to Iran [15]. Faced with particularly strong protests from the United States (the last foreign power to have military bases in Niger after the departure of French forces in December 2023), which threatened sanctions against the ruling junta, the latter announced on May 14, 2024 that it was breaking off military cooperation with Washington [16] and invited American forces to leave the country [17]. This episode illustrates the rapprochement between Iran and the countries of the Sahel and the latter’s exploitation of “anti-Western” sentiment in the region [18].
Iran disseminates numerous vectors of soft power throughout sub-Saharan Africa. These are primarily religious in nature: in order to gain influence with Africa’s substantial Muslim community (some 500,000 million people by 2021 [19]), the Iranian regime and its institutions organize conferences, religious and political events, work with local partners and manage over a hundred Islamic centers, schools, seminaries and mosques in more than thirty African countries. In addition, Tehran has offered financial and economic incentives to African governments and used two of its charitable organizations, the Iranian Red Crescent and the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, to provide a wide range of free social and health services in several African countries [20].
The two main organizations behind this soft-power campaign are the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization (ICRO), directly affiliated to the Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Al-Mustafa International University, which trains foreign clerics and missionaries worldwide. ICRO coordinates the activities of various Iranian organizations responsible for religious and cultural activities abroad; for example, one of ICRO’s most recent actions in Nigeria was to lead discussions with the Nigerian authorities that resulted in the integration of Persian courses into the curriculum of students at the University of Abuja [21].
Founded in 2007, Al-Mustafa International University is Iran’s leading religious institution. Under the direction of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, the university is responsible for exporting Tehran’s revolutionary ideology, with around a hundred branches throughout the Islamic world, training foreign clerics, scholars and missionaries. Since 2007, over 45,000 clerics and Islamic scholars have graduated from Al-Mustafa, many of whom have been hired by the university as teachers or missionaries and sent to various countries around the world [22].
Nigeria is one of the countries where Iranian influence has been most effective. Thanks to the network of Iranian vectors of influence and Tehran’s support for the Islamic Movement of Nigeria [23] since its foundation in 1984 [24], the Shiite population has grown considerably. According to researcher Sébastien Nemeth, interviewed by RFI [25]: “Iran has a religious agenda: Niger has several million Shiites, even if their dogma is not necessarily the same as in Teheran. But Teheran sees a potential for proselytizing in the region. We’ve seen this in Nigeria. Before the Iranian revolution of 1979, there were no Shiites in the country. Today, at least 2 to 3 million people have converted”. Today, conversions to Shi’ism continue [26] and continue to be supported by the activities of ICRO and Al-Mustafa University.
Beyond the religious aspect, the vectors of Iranian soft power are politic and economic. On January 10 2023, for example, Iran opened eight business centers across Africa [27], with the aim of encouraging Iranian companies to set up in the region and boosting the activity of those already present [28]. On March 10, 2023, the Iranian authorities organized their first “Iran-West Africa Economic Summit” in Tehran [29], renamed on April 26, 2024 “Conference for Economic Cooperation between Iran and Africa” for its second edition, again in the Iranian capital [30]. The authorities are convinced that “the future of world trade will be determined in Africa [31]”, and have therefore stepped up initiatives to increase Iran’s presence on the African continent.
From a political point of view, the Iranian authorities are increasing the number and nature of soft-power vectors; on the model of the pro-Iranian Spanish-language channel “Hispan TV” [32], for example, in October 2017 they launched a Hausaphone news channel, “Hausa TV” [33], aimed at the more than 50 million Hausa speakers in Africa, mainly in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Despite its resolutely African language, this channel [34] mainly provides information on Iran, the “Axis of Resistance” struggle against Israel and the place of Shiite Islam in Africa. Following the example of Turkish “drone diplomacy”, the Iranian authorities exploit the military and media success of their drones, deployed notably in Ukraine on behalf of Russia, to advance their geopolitical pawns in the region; thus, the sale of Nigerian “yellow-cake” is said to have been conditional on Teheran’s delivery of combat drones [35]. The same is true of Sudan, with which Iran is said to have sought to negotiate - in vain, it would appear [36] - the provision of a naval base on the Red Sea [37] in exchange for a combat ship and in compensation for the numerous drones already delivered by Teheran and used extensively [38] in the civil war opposing Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo’s “Rapid Support Forces” to Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s regular Sudanese army since April 15, 2023.
Since the election of Ebrahim Raissi in 2021, and particularly from 2022/2023 onwards, the Iranian authorities have gone on the offensive in Africa to increase their presence and influence; For Tehran, this satisfies the triple ambition of securing strategic interests - such as uranium in Niger - intensifying the spread of Shiism in sub-Saharan Africa, and developing its network of partners committed to a multi-partner approach, even opposed to the European and North American powers. If Ebrahim Raissi had been one of the main architects of this protean offensive in Africa, his death should not prove a hindrance to Iranian expansion on the African continent. Whatever the identity of the future president, the Islamic Republic should continue to forge ever-stronger ties with the various African countries and local players that are in its interests - or, at least, inclined to be.
French Version:
La présence croissante de l’Iran en Afrique
Emile Bouvier
Emile Bouvier est chercheur indépendant spécialisé sur le Moyen-Orient et plus spécifiquement sur la Turquie et le monde kurde. Diplômé en Histoire et en Géopolitique de l’Université Paris 1 - Panthéon-Sorbonne, il a connu de nombreuses expériences sécuritaires et diplomatiques au sein de divers ministères français, tant en France qu’au Moyen-Orient. Sa passion pour la région l’amène à y voyager régulièrement et à en apprendre certaines langues, notamment le turc.
Anne-Sophie Vial
Anne-Sophie Vial est spécialisée dans la coopération internationale. Diplômée en Droit et Relations internationales - sécurité & défense à l’Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, elle gère au quotidien de nombreux partenariats, notamment au Moyen-Orient, région dans laquelle elle se déplace régulièrement. Elle traduit en anglais les articles des Clés du Moyen-Orient.
Notes
[1] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/05/10/l-uranium-du-niger-au-c-ur-de-negociations-clandestines-avec-l-iran_6232514_3212.html
[2] https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/diplomatie-vers-une-cooperation-solide-entre-le-mali-et-l-iran
[4] https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/707856/Iran%E2%80%99s-deputy-FM-meets-with-Nigerien-foreign-minister-in-Niamey
[5] https://www.hoover.org/research/tehran-ouagadougou-iran-finds-geopolitical-opportunities-burkina-faso
[6] https://voanews.com/a/iranian-president-visits-kenya-in-effort-to-boost-economic-ties/7177325.html
[8] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/iran-signs-agreements-with-zimbabwe-as-raisi-wraps-up-africa-tour
[9] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/irans-raisi-make-first-visit-algeria-14-years-africa-ties-grow
[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-signs-economic-agreements-with-zimbabwe-raisi-ends-africa-tour-2023-07-13/
[12] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1529563/politique/liran-tend-la-main-au-niger-pour-surmonter-les-sanctions/
[13] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/04/iran-hails-african-countries-resistance-to-colonialism_6123273_4.html
[14] In the case of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in particular.
[15] https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-ouest/2024/04/30/sous-l-oeil-de-washington-teheran-negocie-avec-niamey-l-acquisition-de-300-tonnes-d-uranium,110220992-ge0
[16] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/05/14/au-niger-la-question-de-l-uranium-a-l-origine-de-la-discorde-avec-les-etats-unis-selon-le-premier-ministre_6233213_3212.html
[17] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/05/20/au-niger-la-junte-au-pouvoir-donne-quatre-mois-aux-etats-unis-pour-quitter-le-pays_6234467_3212.html
[18] https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1371817/sur-fond-daccord-avec-liran-le-niger-rompt-sa-cooperation-militaire-avec-les-etats-unis.html
[21] https://en.icro.ir/News-Abuja/The-Department-of-Persian-Language-will-be-launched-at-the-University-of-Abuja-soon
[23] This movement, founded in 1984, campaigns for the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Nigeria. Its leader, Ibraheem Yaqoub Zakzaky, converted to Shiism after a trip to Iran; today, he is in detention and the MIN is considered by the Nigerian authorities as a terrorist organization. However, the movement still has several tens of thousands of members and continues to regularly demonstrate its public support for Iran.
[25] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240127-iran-visite-premier-ministre-du-niger-ali-mahaman-lamine-zeine-sanctions-accords-militaires-economiques
[27] Specifically in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria and South Africa.
[29] https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/117421/1st-iran-west-africa-economic-summit-convenes-in-tehran
[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-2-2024-iran-pursues-economic-and-military-influence
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