Türkiye, the new regional power in Africa (1/3). "African solutions for African problems”

Indeed, at the beginning of the 21st century, Türkiye’s presence in Africa was relatively limited, both from a diplomatic and economic point of view; as for the security aspect, it was practically non-existent. Over the past two decades, and particularly under the premiership and presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [1], the situation has changed radically: while the number of Turkish embassies on the continent has almost quadrupled between 2002 and 2022 [2], the value of bilateral trade between Türkiye and Africa has increased eightfold between 2003 and 2022 [3] and the value of Turkish defence industry exports has risen by 653.53% from 2015 to 2021 [4]; from 2005 to the present day, services operated by the Turkish national airline Turkish Airlines between Türkiye and the African continent have increased by some 1140%.

Türkiye’s burgeoning presence in Africa therefore appears resolutely protean, competing with the growing investment in the continent by other Middle Eastern players such as Iran, the Arabian Peninsula and Israel. However, none of Ankara’s Middle Eastern rivals in Africa has invested as much as the latter to date, making Türkiye increasingly and indisputably a genuine regional power on the African continent.

This article therefore sets out to describe the Turkish presence in Africa, taking a thematic approach: firstly, the political and, in many respects, religious investment of the Turkish authorities on the African continent will be examined (first part); then, intrinsically linked to this, the economic issues will be detailed (second part) before moving on to the deployment of Turkish hard power: cooperation and military interventions (third and final part).

Part One: "African solutions for African problems”

Initially moderate, Turkish political investment in Africa has been characterised by a marked increase in power since the beginning of the 21st century and, more particularly, since the primacy of Recep Tayip Erdoğan (first sub-section); through this increased diplomatic presence and the deployment of numerous vectors of soft power such as humanitarian, educational and religious works (second sub-section), Türkiye has succeeded in establishing itself as a regional power offering the virtues of an alternative partner to the traditional European, American or Chinese powers (third sub-section), thus opening the way for promising economic and military cooperation with African countries.

1. A clear rise in Turkish diplomacy in Africa since the beginning of the 21st century

As Türkiye gradually expands its regional and global influence, Africa has become a major area of interest. The African continent is becoming increasingly important because of its vast untapped resources (in Sudan, for example, 90% of oil reserves remain untapped [5]), its growing demography (while Africa accounted for 10% of the world’s population in 1960, it is expected to account for 28% by 2050 [6]), its rapid urbanisation (Africa has the highest urbanisation rate in the world [7]) and the development of its middle class (which has tripled in thirty years [8]). Rich in raw materials and guaranteeing a promising market, increasingly distant from its former colonial powers and in search of alternative partners, Africa has rapidly become a natural - and reciprocal - centre of interest for Türkiye.

Ankara’s intention to significantly develop its presence in Africa was first set out by Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, who published his "Action Plan for Africa" in 1998 [9]. In this document, Türkiye sets out areas of effort that should enable it to develop its future political, economic and cultural ties with African countries; it also formulates certain political recommendations [10] that will become guidelines in the years to come. While this document defines Türkiye’s action plan towards the African continent, it was not until 2005, declared the "Year of Africa" by the Turkish authorities, that the exponential curve of Turkish diplomatic investment on the African continent gradually began to take shape. Prior to 2005, Türkiye’s relations with Africa were mainly limited to the countries of North Africa, with which Ankara shares a common history, that of the Ottoman Empire, and a common religion, Islam.

Since then, Turkish-African relations have spread to the entire continent and are now institutionalised in a number of ways; Türkiye, for example, acquired observer status within the African Union in 2005 before obtaining strategic partner status with the same organisation in 2008 [11]. The same year, it organised its first Türkiye-Africa summit in Istanbul, which was repeated in 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, and then again in Istanbul in 2021 [12]. In addition to discussions on the various avenues for developing relations between Ankara and the various African countries - 39 of which had sent representatives by 2021 [13] out of the 55 countries that make up Africa - the summit was the occasion for numerous concomitant bilateral meetings, regularly leading to the signing of treaties or trade agreements [14].

Since the holding of these summits, the creation of diplomatic links - and sometimes personal links between leaders, following the example of the friendly relationship maintained between the current Turkish president and the former president of Niger Mohamed Bazoum [15] - has become one of the priorities, if not the embodiment, of the Turkish diplomatic offensive in Africa; thus since 2003, R.T. Erdoğan has made official visits to 31 African countries [16] while high-level visits by Turkish dignitaries have taken place at least once a year for the past twenty years [17]. The network of Turkish embassies on the African continent has grown from 12 countries in 2002 to 43 countries in 2023 [18], with plans to open three more embassies in Africa over the next few years [19]; keen to help create a generation of foreign diplomats sensitive to Türkiye, the latter trains several dozen diplomats every year on Turkish soil [20], many of them Africans, such as the Somalis, 80 of whose diplomats have been trained by Ankara over the last 15 years [21].

The strengthening of diplomatic ties between Africa and Türkiye is also reflected in the reciprocal interest in working together, as shown by the marked acceleration in the opening of African embassies in Ankara: from 10 in 2008, there are now 38 [22]. Finally, the air routes connecting African countries to Türkiye have grown substantially in recent years, particularly under the impetus of the Turkish authorities through the national Turkish airline, Turkish Airlines. From five African destinations served in 2005, the airline now serves 62 [23].

2. Religious, educational and humanitarian works as vectors of soft power

Finally, religious and humanitarian works also appear to be a diplomatic vector that Ankara does not hesitate to exploit in order to extend its influence across the African continent; Indeed, as set out in the "Action Plan for Africa" in 1998, Türkiye has significantly increased the activity of humanitarian and/or international development institutions in recent years, such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Red Crescent and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). In 15 years, for example, TIKA has opened offices in 22 African countries [24] and run some 7,000 aid programmes - including almost 2,000 in the last five years - in 54 African countries [25]; it has also secured the construction of the "Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital" in Niamey in 2019 [26]. This Turkish desire to combine assistance to African countries with political cooperation with them was well expressed by the Turkish President who, on 22 October 2021, stated that "in Africa, we will leave no friend whose door we have not knocked on, no heart whose wound has not been healed, no country with which we have not collaborated" [27].

In addition to humanitarian aid, these projects are also educational, and involve institutions such as the Yunus Emre Institute - responsible for disseminating the Turkish language, culture and arts - and the Maarif Foundation. Founded on 17 June 2016, the Maarif Foundation provides schooling for young Africans across the continent, as well as teaching them the Turkish language and culture. By July 2024, the foundation was educating 20,000 schoolchildren in 191 educational establishments in 25 countries [28], and around 1,000 of them had been invited to continue their studies in Türkiye [29]. In fact, the awarding of scholarships appears to be one of the key aspects of Ankara’s educational work in Africa, and once again a response to the recommendations set out in the 1998 "Action Plan for Africa". One of the main organisations awarding scholarships is the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), which between 2012 and 2021 awarded scholarships to 12,600 students from 54 African countries [30].

Finally, the religious dimension is an inevitable lever of soft power for Türkiye in Africa. Drawing on the very large Muslim community in Africa - some 500 million souls [31] - the Diyanet, the Turkish administration in charge of religious affairs, is active on almost the entire continent. It carries out aid initiatives - such as supplying meat from sacrifices during the Eid al-Adha festival for the benefit of the most destitute [32] - but is more particularly involved in building mosques and Koranic schools, providing religious education and training imams. In 2021, the second largest mosque in West Africa, whose construction was entirely funded by the Diyanet, was inaugurated in the Ghanaian capital Accra [33]; in 2013, the Eyup Sultan mosque, funded by the Diyanet, was inaugurated in the Malian capital Bamako [34], as was the Delenc mosque in Sudan in 2019 [35] or the one in Djibouti - the largest in East Africa - in the same year [36] ; With the exception of the Sudanese mosque, all bear names that refer to Turkish culture and reproduce the style of Ottoman mosques inherited from the work of Mimar Sinan, the architect behind the Süleymaniye mosque in Istanbul, inaugurated in 1557 [37]. The most recent mosque built by the Diyanet in Africa is the Gül Mosque, inaugurated on 21 March 2024 in the Ugandan district of Luwero [38].

3. An alternative to the traditional powers of yesteryear

With its strong diplomatic and socio-religious presence in Africa, Türkiye is now in a position to establish itself as an alternative to the former colonial powers, the United States and even China. As an industrialised Muslim country with no colonial or belligerent past in Africa, Türkiye offers a form of "third way" that is not to the displeasure of the continent’s countries: Indeed, Ankara is basing its cooperation on the declared desire to share with African countries the development formula that has made it a success and ensured the effectiveness of its own economic growth. Rather than creating new relations of dependence, as China is regularly accused of doing [39], Türkiye’s approach officially focuses on political equality, mutual economic development and long-term partnership, as the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s slogan "African solutions for African problems" [40] suggests; in the economic sphere, this approach also means that Turkish investments and financial donations in Africa are not subject to conditions relating to governance (improvement of democratic institutions, respect for human rights [41], sexual minorities [42], etc.), as is required of Türkiye.), as is usually the case with American [43] or European aid programmes, for example.

Libya is a particularly eloquent example of this Turkish "third way": in the midst of a game of great powers (Marshal Haftar, for example, being supported by France and Russia), Ankara has managed to establish itself in 2019-2020 as an essential - and relatively unrivalled - ally of the Tripoli government, opening the way to substantial economic and military spin-offs which will be dealt with in the second and third parts of this article. In the same vein, the Turkish authorities are endeavouring to reach out to all African countries, including those currently marginalised by a highly deteriorated domestic situation, such as Libya and Somalia, now one of Türkiye’s greatest allies in Africa: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister at the time, visited Mogadishu in 2011 in what was then the first visit by an official from a non-African country to Somalia for twenty years [44].

The Sahel is also one of the most recent examples of this "Turkish third way" diplomatic strategy in Africa: since the gradual withdrawal of European - especially French - and American diplomatic and military forces [45] from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger over the last two years, Türkiye has rapidly succeeded in filling this void by establishing itself as an alternative partner respectful of the sovereignty of these states and claiming a resolutely "anti-colonialist" approach [46]. No sooner had Franco-Malian relations deteriorated sharply in 2022 - leading, in particular, to the departure of the French troops stationed in Mali during the year - than Ankara sent a delegation to Bamako in June 2022 to assure them that "Türkiye [was] ready to supply the Malian market to the tune of 500 million dollars" [47]; a few days later, the Turkish president held talks with the new head of the junta, Assimi Goïta [48] and, a few weeks later still, Mali revealed with great fanfare the delivery of Bayraktar TB2 UAVs [49], a prominent instrument of Turkish soft power since 2019. The same happened in Niger: while US troops were leaving the country on 7 July 2024, Ankara signed an energy and security cooperation agreement with Niamey ten days later [50].

Türkiye’s political investment in Africa, visible in particular through the deliberate deployment of numerous vectors of soft power, has been exponential in recent years and has enabled it to establish itself as a regional power readily accepted by African countries, which see it as an independent and alternative partner to the "Western" countries. This political rapprochement naturally serves particularly ambitious strategic and economic objectives on the part of Ankara, which will be detailed in the second part of this article.

French Version : La Turquie, nouvelle puissance régionale en Afrique (1/3). « Des solutions africaines pour des problèmes africains »